

CHAPTER I

HUSSERL'S NEW PHENOMENOLOGY OF TIME CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BERNAU MANUSCRIPTS

Rudolf Bernet

Abstract. This paper has no other ambition than to provide a short historical and systematic overview of the analysis of time-consciousness developed in the Bernau manuscripts. More specifically, it investigates where these manuscripts make a significant progress when dealing with problems which had remained unsolved in the earlier texts of Hua X, and where they pave the way for to the later C-manuscripts. Four main areas of renewal are signaled out: (1) a better account of transcendental constitution and how it applies to the meaning of immanent temporal objects, but not to the self-awareness of the temporal flux of consciousness; (2) the renewal of the meaning of transcendental constitution through a “genetic” analysis of the emergence of all acts of intentional consciousness; (3) a better account of the consciousness of a present now in terms of a process of fulfillment in which retentions and protentions are interwoven; (4) a fresh interest in specifically noematic temporal characteristics and their contribution to a phenomenological ontology, especially with regard to individuation. These new insights have decisive consequences for the treatment of all the well-known technical issues in Husserl’s phenomenology of time: the use of the schema “apprehension – apprehension-content” for the intentional consciousness of (different sorts of) temporal objects; the infinite regress arising from the search for an absolute foundation of time-consciousness; the distinction between a passively (and unconsciously?) lived-through temporal stream and the modification it undergoes when it becomes an object of reflection. Emphasizing where progress has been made, the paper, however, also points to the remaining, and possibly structural, “*Aporien*” that Husserl himself admits of in his Bernau manuscripts.

I.

Despite their considerable size, Husserl’s so-called “Bernau Manuscripts” were written over a relatively brief span of time. Husserl stayed in Bernau

*An earlier version of his text was first published as Rudolf Bernet: *Die neue Phänomenologie des Zeitbewusstseins in Husserls Bernauer Manuskripten*. In: *Die erscheinende Welt. Festschrift für Klaus Held*. Ed. by H. Hüni and P. Trawny, Berlin 2002, 539–555. English translation by Mark Green and the author.

in both August and September 1917 as well as February and March 1918. The general theme of the texts, which were written in those less than five months or so, was consistently paraphrased by Husserl with the heading "Time and Individuation." The motivation for this renewed preoccupation with the problem of time shortly after his relocation to Freiburg was influenced by Edith Stein's project of editing the earlier time analyses. A first edit of these earlier manuscripts, which consisted of, above all, the lectures of 1904/1905, but also included some texts from the following years until 1911, was jointly revised by Husserl and Stein during her presence in Bernau in the summer of 1917. But, as usual with Husserl, this revision soon led to new investigations, which in turn demanded all of Husserl's attention. Much to the dismay of Stein, Husserl now had very little time and interest remaining for the engagement with the earlier time manuscripts, and a couple of months later and after several similar experiences, she gave notice to quit her assistantship with Husserl.

For exactly how long Husserl regarded the manuscripts developed in Bernau as merely a complement and continuation of his earlier texts on the consciousness of internal time cannot be reconstructed with certainty. It is certain, however, that Husserl was conscious of the new direction that his engagement with the problem of time had taken in Bernau. No later than his second stay in Bernau at the beginning of 1918, Husserl spoke quite frequently of a new "great work," the contents of which he characterized in a letter to Martin Heidegger on March 28, 1918, as follows: "Time and individuation, a renewal of a rational metaphysics based on principles".¹ A few days later, he described his project even more clearly in a letter to Roman Ingarden on April 5: "For I am working not on a mere phenomenology of time – which cannot be treated separately and purely for itself – but on the colossal problem of individuation, of the constitution of individual (thus "factual") being in general, and that according to its essentially basic formations."²

Then, eight solid years later, in 1926, Husserl contacted Heidegger with a request to prepare his time manuscripts for publication in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*. In doing so he probably hoped at first that Heidegger would consider not only the earlier texts, but also the Bernau Manuscripts. However, because Heidegger did not want to get involved in editing stenographic research manuscripts, Husserl only handed over Stein's edited version of the earlier texts. With

that, the separation of the Bernau Manuscripts from the corpus of the earlier analyses of time was also physically accomplished. When, one year later, in September 1927, Husserl tried to get Ingarden involved in the publication of his time analyses, the project concerned exclusively the texts from Bernau. After this attempt also failed, Husserl finally delivered, probably a full year later near the end of 1928, the material of the Bernau Manuscripts to his assistant Eugen Fink. Meanwhile, in April of the same year, Heidegger had published Stein's edition of the earlier texts making only small changes and adding an "Introductory Remark," in which he refers to a "later publication" of the "continuing studies of time-consciousness in connection with the problem of individuation, especially those undertaken since 1917."³ In the manuscripts from Bernau, compiled by Husserl and handed over to Fink, the problem of individuation, however, is not the major topic. It cannot be said with any great certainty for which reasons and with respect to which publication plan Husserl left out in large part those texts on the problem of individuation, which he had written during his second stay in Bernau. However, these more ontologically oriented time-analyses from Bernau, which centered on the problem of the individuation of different kinds of objectivities, were in fact discovered in Husserl's Nachlass, and some of them were incorporated, together with the manuscripts entrusted to Fink, into the *Husserliana* volume of the Bernau texts which was edited by Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar.⁴

Eugen Fink occupied himself with the Bernau time-manuscripts again and again in the years from 1929 to 1937. Husserl tried to assist the faltering advance of the editing work by granting more and more liberty to his assistant concerning the use of his texts. There was soon talk of a publication that would be supplemented by Fink's own texts and appear under both names. In fact, both Husserl and Fink were intensely preoccupied with the problem of time in the beginning of the thirties, in conversation with each other and in independently producing new texts. Though it was never abandoned, the effort to publish the Bernau Manuscripts receded into the background. Husserl composed numerous manuscripts dealing with the relationship of time-consciousness to hyletic pre-givenness and egoic performances, to sleep, death, and waking, to intersubjectivity and trans-generative historicity, etc. His preoccupation with time thus took a decisive turn in these texts, best known as "The

C-Manuscripts.”⁵ Despite the fact that Husserl himself considered these last time-manuscripts as a continuation of the Bernau investigations, it did not lead him to think that both groups of manuscripts should be blended into a single publication. Not only the considerable size of each group, but also their systematically differing points of departure suggested that Husserl’s middle and late texts on the problem of time should be published separately. Therefore, the publication of the Bernau Manuscripts and the C-Manuscripts as two different volumes in *Husserliana* edition complies with Husserl’s own wishes.

Additionally Fink’s own work on the time-problem did not remain fruitless. “Time and Temporalization,” the treatise which was based on the Bernau Manuscripts and to be jointly published by Husserl and Fink, was transformed with Husserl’s consent (though he could not hide his disappointment) into a new book on time with Fink as the sole author. However, Fink never published any such text. According to his own account, he willfully destroyed the manuscript of his own book. In 1969, he handed over Husserl’s original Bernau Manuscripts, which were entrusted to him at the end of 1928, to the Husserl Archives in Leuven, where they were filed in the *Nachlass* as the “L-Group.” They presently form the core of the Volume XXXIII of the *Husserliana* edition which includes a large selection from all the manuscripts written in Bernau and presents them in a systematic order.

II.

If, following this short sketch of the history of the genesis of the Bernau time-manuscripts, we now turn to their systematic content, it seems appropriate that we situate it in the context of both the earlier manuscripts edited in Volume X of *Husserliana* and the later time-analyses of the C-Manuscripts edited in Volume VIII of *Husserliana-Materialien*.

Husserl’s earlier texts on the phenomenology of time-consciousness take their point of departure from the description of the perception of temporal objects (a constant tone) or time-objects (the duration of the tone). In his engagement (which is completely missing in the Bernau Manuscripts) with the writings of Brentano and Meinong, and also with James, Stumpf, Stern, etc., Husserl’s conviction that the perception of an

enduring object does indeed normally occur in an enduring act of perception, but that the duration of perception alone does not yet explain how the perception of an objective duration is possible, ripened. As with his predecessors, Husserl's analysis of the perception of a temporal duration came to a head with the question of whether and how a present act is able to perceive a temporal extension which exceeds the actual present. In addition Husserl's insight that a duration can be presently grasped only when the present time-object is simultaneously grasped with its preceding and now past givenness, still owed much to his discussions of views defended by his contemporaries.

For this present grasping of a past which is intimately connected with the present grasping of a present, Husserl first used the name "Primary Memory," but soon after he coined the term "Retention." With regard to content, he differed in some significant ways from Brentano and Meinong, in that he understood this retention neither as an act (in the mode of phantasy) of representation (Brentano), nor as a categorial act of a subsequent synthesis (Meinong), but instead as a modality of the perception itself. Thus Husserl wanted, on one hand, to cling to the distinction between the present (primary-impressional) grasping of the present tone and the present (retentional) grasping of the past tone, but on the other hand, he wanted both graspings to still be understood as non-independent moments of the same act of present perception. This was and remained Husserl's fundamental intuition, the analytically elaborated determination of which admittedly still occupied him for several years after a first failed attempt in the Time Lectures of 1904/1905. The investigation into the essence of the present grasping of a futural tone, which Husserl called "Protention," remained a minor point. The topic of protention, and especially its interlacing with retention, first received the attention it deserves in the Bernau Manuscripts.

Husserl's preoccupation with the essence of intuitive *phantasy* and its distinction from the acts of recollection, which spanned years and even extended into his time at Bernau, also played an essential role in the advance of his determination of the essence of retention. From it resulted the insight that the retentional consciousness, in contrast to phantasy and recollection, is indeed not an act of representation [*Vergegenwärtigung*], but nevertheless is a modified consciousness of a (former) original present. The retentional consciousness of the past is

therefore neither a reproductive representation of the past like recollection, nor a simple making-present [*Gegenwärtigung*] of the present like the original perception, but is the modified perception of a past. It was not easy for Husserl to precisely determine the essence of this perception of the past in the framework of his doctrine of intentional consciousness, and the related difficulties also worried him in the Bernau Manuscripts again and again. Problems resulted especially from the application of the schema of the intentional apprehension of a sense-datum, which was borrowed from the phenomenological determination of the external perception of spatial objects, to time-consciousness and therefore also to the retentive perception-consciousness. In reference to the latter, one of the questions that arises concerns how a present apprehension of a similarly present sensation should succeed in retentionally perceiving a present that belongs to the past.

Husserl's various attempts to solve this puzzle ultimately led him again and again to the same point, namely to the givenness of the sense-datum supposedly implicated in retentive consciousness. It soon became obvious that the modification, which characterizes the present retentive consciousness of a past present, must concern not only the apprehension but necessarily also the apprehended sense-datum. Otherwise, it is impossible to understand why a sensation can allow for a perceptual apprehension of something present in one case and, in the other case, allow for a retentive apprehension of something past. The "phantasma," that is, the modified sense-datum of an apprehension in the mode of a phantasy, volunteered itself as a model for the modified content that underlies retentive apprehension. However, a more thorough investigation of phantasy-consciousness proved that this model contains its own peculiar puzzle, one which precisely concerns the essence, that is, the mode of givenness, of this phantasma.

The parallel investigations of retention and phantasy, which continued through the Bernau Manuscripts, soon led to the insight that the difficulties connected with the phenomenological determination of the phantasma are fundamentally the same as those which concern the determination of the modified sense-datum in retentive consciousness. Thus identifying the sense-datum motivating a retentive apprehension with a phantasma helped no further, and it simultaneously threatened to blur the distinction between the presenting retention and the representing

phantasy. Only when one can cling, on the one hand, to the differentiation between the phantasmal and retentive modifications of the contents of apprehension, and also, on the other hand, account for the circumstance that both sense-data concern a modified, sensorial consciousness, of which the general essence must still be clarified, can the phenomenological analyses of retention and phantasy stimulate each other. On closer inspection, the task concerns not only retention and phantasy, but also the consciousness of an unmodified sense-datum that underlies a perceptual apprehension. Husserl called the givenness of one such unmodified, i.e. originally present sensation, "primary impression [*Urimpression*]" in the early texts and "primary presentation [*Urpräsentation*]" in the later Bernau manuscripts.

The first decisive step towards to a clarification of the essence of modified or unmodified givenness of the sensorial content which underlies an intentional apprehension is already to be found in Husserl's earlier texts on time-consciousness, and the insights acquired in them are never called into question in the Bernau Manuscripts. Of whatever kind the intentional apprehension of the sense-datum implicit in retention and phantasy (and also already in perception) may be, that is, if it is a question of a perceptual, retentive, or phantasmal apprehension, it is certain, in any case, that the apprehended sense-datum is itself given; and therefore there must be a modified or unmodified consciousness of it. Thus in the end, the difference between a present sensation and a retentionally given sensation depends on the different consciousness of these sensations.

Husserl named this inner consciousness of the sensation "absolute consciousness" in the earlier texts and then in the Bernau Manuscripts the "originary process [*Urprozess*]" or "originary stream [*Urstrom*]." The sensations were called "immanent time-objects" in the early texts and as such they were distinguished from the transcendent objects belonging to objective time, like, for instance, the tone of a violin. The Bernau Manuscripts more simply called these immanent time-objects temporal "events [*Ereignisse*]" and the inner consciousness of them "lived-experience [*Erlebnis*]." This alteration in terminology is already a first indication that it was no longer self-evident for Husserl in Bernau that (modified and unmodified) sensations are given in the originary process as objects and that the originary process itself had the form of an objectifying intentional consciousness.

The introduction of the “absolute” consciousness in the earlier texts involved many problems, which still bothered Husserl in Bernau. A first difficulty arose with the exact determination of the nature of this “absolute” consciousness in its relationship to the “immanent time-objects.” In the manuscripts from the *Nachlass* published in Hua X one can trace how Husserl finally arrived at a two-fold insight on this matter. *First*, it soon became clear to him that the so-called “absolute” consciousness of the sense-data was a kind of intentional consciousness; that is, the sense-data could not belong to the “absolute” consciousness as “reelle” constituents. Otherwise the difference between a modified and an unmodified, i.e., between a retentive and a primary-impressional consciousness of a sensation, would have become unintelligible. Husserl’s *second* new insight, resulting from the introduction of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, consisted in the new characterization of the relationship between “absolute” consciousness and sense-data as a relation of *constitution*. Similarly as a transcendent object is constituted in the apprehension of a sense-datum, the sensation is also constituted in the “absolute” consciousness as a (present, past, or futural) immanent time-object.

Then, in the Bernau Manuscripts, both these insights were again subjected to thorough examination, and admittedly, it seems without conclusive results. In many of these Bernau texts Husserl began to doubt again whether the relationship between the “originary process” and temporal “events” is really a matter of transcendental constitution, and whether this “originary process” and these “events” really belong to two different levels of consciousness. This doubt had its source above all in the question of whether the “events” in the “originary process” really come to prominence and grasping as immanent objects. With this, the first insight was also called into question again, namely the designation of the originary process as a kind of intentional consciousness. Incidentally, these doubts and questions still bothered Husserl in the late texts on time of the C-Group. On the one hand, this seems to confirm the impression that no final characterization of the connection between the “originary process” and temporal “events” is advanced in the Bernau Manuscripts. On the other hand, however, it is unmistakable that those later texts of the C-Group develop a doctrine that, along with other doctrines, can already be found in the Bernau Manuscripts.

Put succinctly, this doctrine consists in the attempt of a radical separation between egoic and pre-egoic, i.e. hyletic, time-processes. The indepth investigation of the difference between an egoic and actively performed temporalization, on the one hand, and an anonymous and passively occurring, material or hyletic temporalization, on the other, leads Husserl in the C-Manuscripts to deny that this pre-egoic flowing stream can be ascribed any original constitutive performance. According to this view, one can only speak of a constitution of temporal objects when there is an active involvement of the transcendental ego. In order to acquire a constitutive signification, the pre-intentional hyletic originary stream thus needs to undergo a thorough modification which consists in a subsequent performance of an egoic act of reflection on it. This new model of the originary process admittedly has its ground not only in the separation between active and passive forms of consciousness, but also in the problem of the *infinite regress*, which lurks behind Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness, both in the early texts as well as in the Bernau Manuscripts and in the later time-manuscripts of the C-Group.

It can already be gathered from the early texts published in Hua X that there are, in fact, different forms of such an infinite regress. A *first* form arises from the fact that each newly emerging "primary impression," or each new "primary presentation," modifies the mode in which the former primary impression is given, transforming it into a retention of a past primary impression. A third new primary impression then modifies not only the previous (second) primary impression, but equally the retention of the first primary impression which is connected with it. This first primary impression is therefore now given under the form of a modification of a modification. With the fourth new primary impression, the givenness of every single past primary impression is modified once more, and the givenness of the first primary impression now has the mode of the modification of a modification of a modification. As long as the originary process remains lively, i.e. as long as new primary impressions surface in consciousness, this complicated process of a continuous and multidimensional modification of the modification of the givenness of each past primary impression carries on, potentially *ad infinitum*. Thus, in the latter case, the retentive grasping of the initial primary impression would be tied to a running-through of an infinite series of modifications nested into one another.⁶

This first *regressus ad infinitum* is comparatively harmless because it does not call into question the possibility of grasping a first primary impression. However, the Bernau Manuscripts reveal that it became more and more doubtful for Husserl whether such a process of an infinite modification of a retentive past really represents a phenomenologically verified finding. In the course of his new description of time-consciousness in the framework of a genetic phenomenology, Husserl increasingly concerned himself with the consequences the constantly (with each reiteration of retentive modification) growing distancing from the present has for the retentive givenness of the past. He described how the primary presentations belonging to a far-distant past fuse together and thereby not only lose their clear distinction from one another, but also their affective allure on the present ego. The Bernau Manuscripts from 1918 dedicate detailed investigations to this phenomenon, which is distinguished from retention and named “fading-away [*Abklang*].” In the absence of an active turning-towards and grasping on the part of the ego, the retentions directed at a distant past soon die off, and with that the process of their continual modification also potentially comes to a standstill. Dead retentions can become newly awakened and rise up again, but this does not immediately do away with their character of indistinctness or haziness.

The *second* form of an infinite regress concerns the awareness of the “absolute consciousness” or of the “originary process.” We have seen that Husserl characterizes the intentional consciousness of a transcendent time-object as an intentional apprehension of a pre-intentional sense-datum. This sense-datum is then, in its turn, experienced by a deeper consciousness, namely by the “absolute consciousness” or “originary process.” The exact determination of this originary process still bothered Husserl very much in the Bernau Manuscripts. Time and again the question surfaced as to whether the so-called “absolute” consciousness should, indeed, be understood as an independent level of consciousness, whether it really concerns an intentional and transcendently constitutive consciousness, and whether the intentionality of this consciousness still has the form of an intentional apprehension of a pre-intentional apprehension-content. The further question then also arises, both in the earlier texts and in the Bernau Manuscripts, as to the nature of the consciousness that makes us aware of the flow of this “absolute consciousness”

or of this "originary process." If the latter consciousness still requires a further consciousness for which it is given, then it loses not only its "absolute" character as an "originary process," but one also falls prey to a form of infinite regress, which would precipitate the whole edifice of the levels of consciousness resting on each other into an abyss.

The risk of such an infinite regress, which is connected with the consciousness of an "absolute" consciousness, was not only formulated with sufficient clarity already in Husserl's early texts, but Husserl also succeeded in finding an attractive solution to the difficulty. The core of this solution lies in the supposition that the "absolute" consciousness must necessarily and simultaneously be a consciousness of the givenness of immanent time-objects and a consciousness of its own flow. This solution did not remain a mere hypothesis but on the contrary, Husserl tried to demonstrate in a painstaking analysis of retentive consciousness two points: *first*, due to the continuous change of the time-perspective (or "time-adumbration"), the unity of an immanent time-object, with its respective time-position, comes to prominence in the continuum of the retentive modifications, and *second*, a consciousness of the flow of the continuously self-modifying retentive consciousness itself also arises by means of the "nesting [*Verschachtelung*]" of each retention with all the other retentions. Therefore, the flow of the "absolute" retentive consciousness entails a double intentionality, of which one is directed to immanent time-objects and the other has the form of a self-reference, i.e. of a self-awareness of the flow. Husserl termed the former direction of the retentive intentionality "transverse-intentionality [*Querintentionalität*]" and the latter "longitudinal intentionality [*Längsintentionalität*]." Finally, Husserl also specifically stressed that both these intentional directions in the course of the flow of the continuous retentive modifications belong to one selfsame process and therefore are "inseparably" connected with one another.⁷

This attempt at overcoming the danger of the infinite regress related to the consciousness of the "originary process" was taken up again and more widely developed in the Bernau Manuscripts. In accordance with the earlier texts, a clear distinction between the retention of an immanent object and the retention of the originary process is made. However, Husserl does make a significant advance by now paying more attention to *protentive* consciousness. This newly awakened and long overdue interest in the

contribution of protention not only to a consciousness of the “originary process,” but also to the consciousness of novelty (which is preoccupying Husserl with increasing intensity), is reflected in the new time diagrams one finds in the Bernau Manuscripts. Specifically the precise investigation of the intertwining of retentional and protentional continua of modifications resulted in significant new insights. Husserl was no longer satisfied with the suggestion that each primary presentation is embedded in a bilateral horizon of retentional and protentional phenomena, but instead he analyzed, often in microscopic detail, the role of protentions within the continuum of the retentional modification and the influence of retentions on the determination of the contents of the protentions.

This new discovery of the function of both protention within retention and retention within protention resulted from a more dynamic analysis of time-consciousness that was linked with the development of a genetic phenomenology. This new perspective is made apparent by the fact that, for example, “primary presentation” (or the former “primary impression”) is now no longer understood as the original core or “source-point” of time-consciousness, but instead as a mere limit point in which the continua of retentional and protentional modifications intersect. In such a genetic analysis, the originary process shows itself to be more than a mere mechanical process of continuous modification resulting from the pushing-back of the present into the past. On the contrary, this originary process, as the life-process of consciousness, is governed by passive tendencies and anticipations, by forms of the increasing and weakening of the intuitive fullness of different phenomena, by the lived-experiences of an incessant “fulfillment [*Erfüllung*]” and “emptying [*Entfüllung*].”

For the understanding of the phenomenon of an inner awareness of the originary process these new investigations led Husserl to no longer consider the emergence of such a self-consciousness to be exclusively a matter of retention, i.e. of a retentional “longitudinal intentionality.” According to the Bernau Manuscripts, this self-consciousness of the originary process rather arises from the experience of a *present* intuitive fulfillment, i.e. by virtue of the consciousness of the continuous transition of retentional protentions to their intuitive realization. In this dynamic, flowing process of fulfillment, the flow of consciousness itself comes to a present appearance through the awareness of the fact that what is presently given is the same as what one had already anticipated in the past as something

futural. The present lived-experience of a temporal fulfillment has therefore in reality the form of a conscious awareness of a becoming-present of a past anticipation. Unlike the earlier texts, which ascribe the self-awareness of the originary stream of consciousness to a merely subsequent retentive form of consciousness, the Bernau Manuscripts emphasize the possibility of a self-consciousness essentially anchored in the flowing present.

It must be admitted, however, that this new doctrine concerning the consciousness of the originary process does not obtain throughout all the Bernau texts and that it was again the threat of an infinite regress that made Husserl consider alternative, or rather, competing conceptions. The new model of an originary self-awareness of the temporal flow of consciousness still takes for granted that the originary process is an independent level of intentional consciousness, responsible for the constitution of immanent time-objects such as sense-data and even the acts of their intentional apprehension. We have already mentioned that this understanding of the originary process is seriously called into question in several of the Bernau texts. At the end of his detailed discussion of the difference between an implicit perception and the givenness of immanent time-objectivities in the originary stream, Husserl comes to the conclusion that the hypothesis of an originary process that would necessarily remain "unconscious" cannot be considered as a credible alternative to his new account of the self-awareness of the originary process. However, even if he does not allow there to be any such unconscious originary process, the questions still remain regarding the nature of an ungrasped originary process and whether such a process can be ascribed a transcendently constitutive performance. But if the latter is not the case and if a subsequent egoic grasping, thus an act of reflection, is required in order to bestow a constitutive performance on the originary process, then both its independence and intentional character become questionable. Eventually, nothing would be left of an original self-consciousness of the originary process. Alternative determinations of the originary process are possible but again face all the difficulties connected with the possibility of the awareness of the originary process and the threat of an infinite regress.

In the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl's work on these matters cleared at least two different paths. A *first* path leads him again into the vicinity of Brentano's well-known model of inner consciousness, for which he

had, despite severe criticism, already shown much sympathy in his earlier texts. According to this path, the so-called “originary process” would in the end be nothing other than an accompanying phenomenon of the egoic performance of intentional acts in which transcendent time-objects are constituted. Instead of intentionally intending these acts as immanent time-*objects*, the originary process would be nothing more than an inner, non-independent and implicit, awareness of the subjective performance of these acts. The primary process would thus be a form of intentional consciousness in which, however, no temporal “objects” are intended. Only a subsequent act of reflection would turn the performance of the act into an intentional object. It seems, however, that what remains undecided in the Bernau Manuscripts are the questions of whether and how, within this intentional act of reflection on the original act-performance, the difference between the consciousness of the act and the consciousness of the (originary) consciousness of the act becomes apparent. A *second* path, taken by Husserl in Bernau, or at least discussed in detail, consists similarly in a return to an earlier doctrine. It concerns nothing other than the use of the “apprehension – apprehension-content” schema not only for the determination of how the originary process constitutes immanent time-objects, but also for how the originary process itself, and the primary presentations, retentions and protentions which animate its flow should be understood. However, with this Husserl once more runs the risk of the infinite regress, and it is a characteristic of the relevant Bernau Manuscripts that the matters of applying the schema “apprehension – apprehension-content” to time-consciousness and of exorcising the risk of the infinite regress go mostly hand in hand.

Nevertheless, the difficulty of the infinite regress, which emerges anew again and again within the Bernau Manuscripts, cannot exclusively, and without further ado, be blamed on one or the other, more or less convincing model of the originary process. It presumably concerns a much more fundamental problem involving the system of Husserl’s basic approach to a phenomenology of time altogether. Perhaps it is simply the case that there can be no account of the origin of time which does not already presuppose time. This sort of consideration is also not completely foreign to the Bernau Manuscripts, and it is met with, at least rudimentarily, in Husserl’s treatment of the phenomenon of “novelty” and especially the question of the possibility of a “first” primary presentation.

III.

Our exposition of the systematically embedded place of the Bernau Manuscripts in the problematic horizon and unresolved difficulties of the earlier texts on time-consciousness must not give the impression, however, that these texts would be little more than a mere supplement to Hua X. After all, the years between the last early texts on time-consciousness and the first Bernau Manuscripts, viz., between 1911 and 1917, saw the publication of the first book of *Ideas*.⁸ This work, as is well-known, contains not only a systematic portrayal of the method of the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental idealism connected with it, but also a detailed investigation of the intentional consciousness from the point of view of the noetic-noematic correlation. It also introduces the pure ego, which the *Logical Investigations* still considered to be phenomenologically undetectable. All these new findings found their way into in the Bernau time-manuscripts.

Though Husserl was compelled quite frequently, especially in the treatment of the constitutive function of time-consciousness, to reflect on the essence of the phenomenological reduction and transcendental idealism, the discussion of the constitution of objective time is given conspicuously less attention than the analysis of the constitution of immanent time-objects by the originary process. The Bernau Manuscripts also develop, for the first time, a description of time-consciousness in specifically noematic terms. Far from contenting himself with some general remark about the correlation between the forms of noetic intending of time-objects and the time-modalities of the noematic sense corresponding to them, Husserl dedicated detailed and thorough investigations to the specific nature of these noematic time-modalities and their modifications. This led him further, through his engagement with the question concerning the temporal individuation of different sorts of intentional objects, to the previously mentioned ontological turn in his phenomenology of time. In this context, the Bernau Manuscripts investigate questions such as whether the modes of temporal givenness of an intentional object belong to its noematic sense or not, and whether, in this respect, objects of experience differ from the objects of phantasy and from the ideal objects. Finally, the Bernau texts also take up the question concerning the relationship of time-consciousness to the pure ego, which, after the publication of *Ideas*,

could no longer be avoided. The relevant investigations revolve particularly around the question of an egoic temporalization of events and the becoming-temporal of the pure ego itself, and also around the relation between the hyletic temporality of the originary stream and the temporal lived-experiences accomplished or undergone by an active or passive ego.

However, the inclusion of the (still “static”) transcendental phenomenology of *Ideas* is not the most decisive advance the Bernau Manuscripts make beyond the earlier time-texts; it is rather the newly introduced and consistently developed transition to a “genetic” *phenomenology*. Thus, the breakthrough to this genetic phenomenology did not first happen, as is generally assumed, in the lectures on “Transcendental Logic” of the winter semester of 1920–1921,⁹ but is already in full force in the Bernau time-manuscripts of 1917–1918. This also explains why the reader of the texts from Bernau quite often feels, especially with the treatment of the problem of recollection, reminded of the better known description in the *Analyses of Passive Synthesis*. Needless to say, it is no coincidence that Husserl’s new genetic phenomenology first emerged from his reflections dedicated to the essence of time-consciousness.

In his genetic time-analysis Husserl no longer takes it for granted that the intentionality at work in time-consciousness is an egoic act-intentionality with an objective correlate, like a typical static examination of the correlation would have it. Though such act-intentionality plays an important role in time-consciousness and in its constitutive function, Husserl is now more interested in its arising from pre-intentional tendencies, inclinations, and inhibitions, which characterize the intentionality of a passively flowing originary process. Furthermore, this originary process, as a life-process, is not simply an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal. This determination of the originary process of life as striving toward intuitive givenness forces Husserl, as already mentioned, to a new, dynamic reformulation of the process of temporal fulfillment.

The passively experienced, hyletic originary process stands therefore at the source of the egoic acts of turning-towards, perceiving and grasping. However, it is not only the subject of the egoic performance that is born from this originary stream, but also each present givenness. In fact, the consciousness of the being-present of a givenness arises, as was

indicated above, from the interplay between the retentive and protentive intentionality of the passively experienced originary stream. With this new insight, the privilege of the present as the most originary dimension of time-consciousness could not remain unquestioned by a genetic phenomenology. If each present has a genesis of its emergence, and thus is a present having-come-to-be, then one understands even better why Husserl engages in such a detailed way with the question of whether there can be something like a first primary presentation.

The attentive investigation of the intertwinement of passive and active, anonymous and egoic, intentional performances in time-consciousness finally lead Husserl in Bernau to the discovery of a secondary form of passivity, which characterizes the acts of the ego which have become mere habits. As one would expect, it is above all in the framework of the new genetic analysis of recollection that the Bernau Manuscripts deal with these habitually performed achievements of time-consciousness. Their analysis concerns, in particular, the difference between acts of remembering that are habitually performed and serve a practical aim and acts of remembering that are actively performed and serve the theoretical aim of an ideal exactitude.

Even more than the analysis of recollection, the treatment of the problem of *temporal individuation* shows that, as the already quoted letter from Husserl to Ingarden has it: "phenomenology of time [...] cannot be treated separately and purely for itself [*sich nicht rein für sich ablösen lässt*]." If the task of this phenomenology is to account for the constitution of the temporal determinations of objects in transcendental consciousness, then it must also pay attention to the ontological nature of the temporal modalities of these objects. Modes of time are, according to Husserl's own formulation, modes of being or existence. However, not only the present-being, past-being or futural-being are constituted in time-consciousness, but also, more generally, the individuality of the being of all (empirical) objects. The individuality of an object of experience ultimately always depends on its temporal givenness and especially on its "first" and thus "unique [*einmalig*]" present givenness. However, Husserl soon reflected on the problem concerning the possible or impossible individuation of ideal objects. It belongs to the nature of such ideal objects that they can "always" be apprehended and that their meaning involves no necessary reference to a privileged first or unique form of

givenness. Does this mean that only empirically real objects have an essential reference to time and to a temporal individuation? But then how do we account for the temporality and individuation of the objects of a phantasy? If phantasy-objects, in their mode of being, occupy an intermediate position between empirically individual and ideal objects, then the examination of their temporality will also evince new insights in the difference between the (necessary) individuation of empirical objects and the (contingent) individuation of ideal objects, and more generally, into the difference between “facts” and “essences.”

This explains why Husserl returns time and again to the phenomenological analysis of phantasy-time in those Bernau Manuscripts which have an ontological orientation.¹⁰ It is easy to realize that the individuation of a general essence must not be confused with its instantiation in empirical examples, but Husserl is not satisfied with this purely negative insight. He tries, therefore, to arrive at a positive characterization of the sort of individuation that applies to ideal objects and he does so by examining how phantasy-objects become individual entities through their subjective givenness in phantasy-acts as well as by their inclusion in phantasy-worlds. The investigation of the subjective givenness of ideal objects, as well as of their inclusion in possible logical “worlds,” leads then to results which are not only relevant for Husserl’s project of a “rational metaphysics,” but may also be of interest for today’s logicians.

NOTES

1. Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel* IV. Ed. by K. Schuhmann, Dordrecht 1994, 130.
2. Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel* III. Ed. by K. Schuhmann, Dordrecht 1994, 182.
3. Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* (Hua X). Ed. by R. Boehm, The Hague 1966, xxv. English translation by James S. Churchill in: Edmund Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*. Ed. by M. Heidegger and trans. by James S. Churchill, Bloomington, IN 1964, 15.
4. Edmund Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/1918)* (Hua XXXIII). Ed. by R. Bernet and D. Lohmar, Dordrecht/Boston/London 2001.
5. Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929–1934). Die C-Manuskripte* (Hua Mat VIII). Ed. by D. Lohmar, Dordrecht 2006.
6. Incidentally, it is not difficult to realize that the same infinity applies also to protention. Namely, insofar as each protention fulfilled by a present primary impression was already implicated in an earlier protention, and this earlier protention likewise was anticipated in an even earlier protention, and so forth, the grasping of the process of becoming of the actual present also implies a passing-through of a potentially infinite series of protentions nested into one another.

7. Hua X, Text Nr. 54. English translation by John Barnett Brough in: Edmund Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, Dordrecht 1991, 379–394.
8. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (Hua III,1). Ed. by K. Schuhmann, The Hague 1976. English translation by Fred Kersten in: Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, Dordrecht 1982.
9. Edmund Husserl, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (1918–1926)* (Hua XI). Ed. by M. Fleischer, The Hague 1966. English translation by Anthony J. Steinbock in: Edmund Husserl, *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic*, Dordrecht 2001.
10. Cf. Rudolf Bernet: Real Time and Imaginary Time. On the Husserlian conception of temporal individuation. In: *Husserl and the Logic of Experience*. Ed. by G. Banham, London/New York 2005, 217–236.